Russia's New Defence Doctrine: A return to cold war policy.

On February 5th, President Medvedev approved Russia's new military doctrine at a meeting of the permanent Security Council. Taking part in the meeting were Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Federation Council Speaker Sergei Mironov, State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Sergei Naryshkin, Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, Deputy Prime Minister and Government Chief of Staff Sergei Sobyanin, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, Director of the Federal Security Service Alexander Bortnikov, and Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Mikhail Fradkov.
 
 
Once again, doctrine has returned to the notion that Russia’s greatest threats come from the West.  It is of course true that NATO is developing contingency plans to defend Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania against future Russian attacks. In this unexpected (and possibly inexplicable) shift in policy, the new plans would mark the first time since the end of the Cold War that the Atlantic Alliance has specifically pinpointed Russia as a threat.
 
 
According to the new Russian doctrine, the existing global security structure, which is dominated by NATO, does not ensure the “equal security” of all nations. NATO, along with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, are all “Cold War vestiges,” according to the Kremlin,  and should be replaced by Moscow’s formula for a new security architecture — the pan-European Security Treaty that has effectively been rejected by the west.

 
However, whilst the Kremlin might feel sore about this rejection, we might ask Russia why it vetoed the prolongation of the United Nations and OSCE missions in the Georgian separatist regions, and why does it not allow EU observers to enter these regions, in the aftermath of the 2008 invasion? Russia seems to have a taste only for those international agreements that is has formulated itself.

 
The issue of Ukrainian membership of NATO is raised, although with the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president that is unlikely to happen. There are also concerns about the future intentions of Georgia in this regard - Russia clearly believes that it alone has the right to decide what relationships its neighbours may enter into.

In October, Security Council Chief Nikolai Patrushev spoke about Russia’s right to initiate a nuclear first strike in regional or even local conflicts. Patrushev’s remark understandably evoked sharp criticism in the West, but this first-strike provision has not been found in the military doctrine posted on the Kremlin web site. It is expected that the first-strike doctrine is to be included in the Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020, which has not been released to the public.

Another "defensive" measure is Russia’s right to send troops abroad to protect its “national interests or its citizens.” The use of military force to protect Russian minorities is controversial. In the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin created these “minorities” by issuing Russian passports on a large scale to South Ossetians and Abkhazians. There are significant Russian minorities in several former Soviet republics, and they could, in theory, fall under Moscow’s proclaimed right to protect its “national interests or its citizens.”

However, when the West recognized the independence of Kosovo, Russian sensibilities demanded retaliation, and to them this move provided political justification for their recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The west needs to consider its response to this doctrine carefully: above all, it must not isolate Russia in any way. Obama's "reset" of east-west relations has suffered a blow, as the Kremlin has returned to its cold war mindset. This must be seen as a challenge, not a threat, and the west must take some responsibility for this regrettable step backwards by Russia.

Photo: the Presidential Press and Information Office